requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The subagent template in
code-reviewer.mdinterpolates external data such as{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}and{DESCRIPTION}without using boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or clear delimiters) or instructions to ignore embedded commands. This makes the review process susceptible to indirect prompt injection if an attacker-controlled task plan or code comment contains instructions designed to hijack the subagent's logic. - Ingestion points:
code-reviewer.md(via placeholders{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS},{DESCRIPTION},{PLAN_REFERENCE}). - Boundary markers: None present to delimit injected data from the reviewer's instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system access through
git diffand shell command execution. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation of the interpolated content is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (
git rev-parse,git log,git diff) using variable parameters like{BASE_SHA}and{HEAD_SHA}. While these are standard for a git-based workflow, they represent a potential command injection surface if the commit references or descriptions are sourced from untrusted input without proper sanitization.
Audit Metadata