self-media-video-publisher
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/sau-adapter.mdprovides explicit instructions for the user to clone and install a third-party tool from a non-trusted GitHub repository (dreammis/social-auto-upload). The installation process involves downloading external browser binaries and multiple dependencies from unverified sources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/publish.mjsexecutes the externalsautool using thenode:child_process.spawnmethod to perform video uploads. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/publish.mjsscript allows the path to thesaubinary to be defined via a command-line argument (--sau). This allows the agent or a user to point the script toward any executable on the system, which is then executed with arguments parsed from the project files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill parses video and thumbnail file paths directly from Markdown files in the user's project directory and passes them as arguments to the upload command.
- Ingestion points: Markdown files for each platform (e.g.,
抖音.md,youtube.md) located within the path provided by the--episodeargument inscripts/publish.mjs. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdfile mandates a "List execution plan" step and "Get per-platform authorization," and thepublish.mjsscript requires manual confirmation ((y/N)) before processing each platform. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read files (
node:fs/promises.readFile), write to files (appendFile,writeFile), and execute external processes (node:child_process.spawn). - Sanitization: The script uses
path.resolveto handle paths extracted from the markdown content (viafieldPathinscripts/publish.mjs) but does not validate that the paths point to legitimate media files, potentially allowing an attacker to specify sensitive system files for upload.
Audit Metadata