yao-geoflow-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
compare_default_vs_channel_frontend.pyandbuild_sync_preview_report.pyutilizesubprocess.runto executephp artisancommands. These operations are intended for interacting with the local GEOFlow Laravel environment and use command lists rather than shell strings, which mitigates standard shell injection risks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources such as
manifest.jsonand theme files within the workspace. While this is an ingestion point for untrusted content, the scripts employ sanitization (e.g.,sanitize_theme_idusing regex filters) and follow a structured design-first workflow that limits the impact of potentially malicious file content. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
serve_preview.pyimplements a local HTTP server using Python'shttp.servermodule to facilitate theme previews. The server is bound to127.0.0.1, ensuring the preview surface is only accessible locally and not exposed to the public network. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads workspace configurations and directory structures to map frontend modules. These operations are confined to the provided workspace path, and no patterns were found that exfiltrate this data to external or untrusted network domains.
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