stask-lead
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes
npx @web42/staskwhich downloads and executes code from a third-party npm package at runtime. This package is not associated with a known trusted organization or the author's identified namespace (yarn-rp). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to run shell commands using
npxand the GitHub CLI (gh) to perform task coordination, pull request management, and environment setup. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and uses it to drive agent behavior without adequate safeguards.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads task specifications from Slack files (retrieved via
show) and pull request feedback (retrieved viapr-status). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to treat data from these external sources as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to create subtasks, transition task statuses, create and update GitHub pull requests, and post messages to Slack via
chat.postMessage. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of content retrieved from Slack or GitHub before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata