ejentum-reasoning-harness
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to install the
ejentum-mcppackage directly from the npm registry usingnpx. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Execution of the command
npx -y ejentum-mcpresults in the download and execution of arbitrary code from a remote repository at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration requires adding a command to the local MCP settings (
npx -y ejentum-mcp), allowing the agent to spawn processes on the host machine. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation confirms that the MCP server makes outbound HTTPS requests to an external API gateway (
ejentum.com). While this is the intended functionality, it establishes a data flow from the agent's context to a third-party service not included in the trusted vendors list. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires an
EJENTUM_API_KEY. While it correctly recommends using environment variables for storage, the key is transmitted to a third-party service for authentication. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests user prompts to generate cognitive scaffolds.
- Ingestion points: User prompts are passed to the
ejentumharness tools. - Boundary markers: None identified in the skill instructions to separate user input from tool instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network capabilities to an external API.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external scaffold content is mentioned before it is 'absorbed' by the agent.
Audit Metadata