channel-formula
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from video titles and descriptions during the intake process. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in social media metadata could influence the agent's extraction logic.
- Ingestion points: Intake section evidence (video titles and descriptions).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the analyzed video data.
- Capability inventory: Local file-system writes (creating persistent profiles in
~/.claude/skills/). - Sanitization: Absent; no validation or escaping of the external titles is performed.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains directives instructing the agent that the generated profile should "override generic skills where they conflict." This creates a hierarchy of instructions that could potentially be used to supersede general behavioral guidelines if the generated profile were to be populated with malicious or conflicting rules.
Audit Metadata