code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources and interpolates it into prompts for sub-agents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is gathered from
git diffoutput,git logcommit messages, and external specification sources fetched via the workflow described indocs/agents/issue-tracker.mdor from files in.scratch/. - Boundary markers: The process in Step 4 for spawning sub-agents lacks explicit instructions to use delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when including the untrusted diff and spec content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
gittools to read repository state and spawns sub-agents to perform qualitative analysis of that state. - Sanitization: There is no documentation of sanitization or escaping of the gathered external content before it is processed by the AI sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands (
git diff,git log,git rev-parse) using a user-supplied<fixed-point>argument. This is a necessary component of the skill's primary function but represents a standard command injection surface if the underlying execution platform does not properly sanitize the input reference.
Audit Metadata