babysit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub Pull Request comments and review threads which could contain malicious instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is retrieved from external sources using
gh pr viewandget-pr-commentsinSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or "ignore" instructions when interpolating this external data into its internal triage and action logic.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to modify the local codebase (via
fix-ciand conflict resolution) and execute system commands.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the content of PR comments before the agent triages them or replies to them.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and executes JavaScript code via a shell command, creating a risk of code injection.\n
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md(Step 4), anode -ecommand is used to record entries in a verification ledger. The script is built by interpolating variables like<N>,<HEAD_SHA>, and<command>directly into a JavaScript string literal.\n - Risk: If any of these variables (particularly
<command>, which may come from external check names or tool output) contain single quotes or malicious JavaScript fragments, it could break the string literal and execute arbitrary code.\n - Implementation details: The script uses
require.resolveand dynamicimport()with paths computed from environment variables (CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT,OMC_PLUGIN_ROOT) and local package searches.
Audit Metadata