interrogate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill orchestrates a workflow where findings from automated reviewers (which process untrusted code) include shell commands that the lead agent is instructed to execute. This creates a risk that malicious code under review could influence a reviewer to generate harmful commands.
  • Ingestion points: Reviewer findings containing a command in the "evidence" field are ingested by the lead agent in Phase 3 of the SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define any delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the command strings.
  • Capability inventory: The lead agent has the capability to execute shell commands to verify findings.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The lead agent is explicitly told to "re-run each finding's command yourself" to verify the reproduction of findings, bypassing potential validation logic.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell commands constructed at runtime by AI models. Phase 3 of SKILL.md directs the agent to re-run commands provided in the "evidence" field of the reviewer output, which constitutes the execution of dynamically generated code from a potentially untrusted source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses arbitrary shell command execution as a verification tool. While this is the intended primary purpose for "stress-testing" code, it lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent the execution of malicious commands if the reviewer's output is compromised or hallucinated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 08:36 PM