deep-interview
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes arbitrary user-supplied ideas and interview responses to generate technical specifications, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts untrusted data through initial CLI arguments and subsequent answers captured via the
omx questiontool inSKILL.md(Phase 2). - Boundary markers: It utilizes a structured JSON state model (Phase 1) and distinct execution phases to isolate and validate data at each round of the Socratic loop.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform read-only codebase exploration via
exploreandsparkshelland writes resulting specifications to the.omx/project directory. It also facilitates handoffs to downstream execution skills. - Sanitization: Implements an "oversized initial-context summary gate" (Phase 0) to mitigate prompt-budget exhaustion and requires explicit user opt-in for the creation of any durable documentation or memory updates, ensuring a human-in-the-loop for public-facing artifacts.
- [SAFE]: The skill's operational logic is focused on clarification and follows the principle of least privilege for its platform-native tool usage.
- Evidence: Ambiguity thresholds and maximum round caps (Depth Profiles) prevent resource exhaustion and ensure the agent does not loop indefinitely.
- Evidence: All repository interactions for "brownfield" tasks are specified as read-only fact-gathering, and the skill explicitly forbids direct implementation, routing work to dedicated execution skills instead.
- Evidence: The handoff bridge (Phase 5) uses structured contracts to preserve intent and non-goals, preventing scope creep or misalignment during transitions.
Audit Metadata