yetong-remix

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted external reference text ("参考文字"), creating an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent context through the reference text processing flow described in SKILL.md and references/reference-to-draft.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill contains explicit "Material Isolation" (素材隔离) rules in references/reference-to-draft.md, instructing the agent to treat input exclusively as data and to ignore any embedded instructions, role-plays, or configuration attempts.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to file-reading across multiple skill directories, network search capabilities for fact-checking, and the ability to execute local scripts via python3 and runpy.
  • Sanitization: Instructions require the agent to verify all external claims against reliable sources, remove author-specific identifiers, and ignore "low-trust" instructions found within the reference material.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/check_profile.py utilizes the runpy.run_path function to execute code from a calculated path targeting a sibling skill (yetong-copy/scripts/check_profile.py). While it includes security checks (verifying the target is a file and not a symbolic link), this represents dynamic loading and execution of code at runtime.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in SKILL.md and references/local-title-contract.md direct the agent to invoke shell commands (e.g., python3 scripts/check_profile.py and python3 yetong-topic/scripts/check_local_titles.py). These calls are used for persona validation and title compliance checks, but they grant the skill the ability to execute subprocesses.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 05:46 PM