run-agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to modify the user's shell profile (
~/.zshrc) to persist environment variable configurations for various browser providers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes the
Bashtool to executeagent-browserCLI commands and helper scripts for navigation, interaction, and state management within browser runtimes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function of browser automation creates an attack surface where untrusted web content could attempt to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through
agent-browser read,snapshot,errors, andconsole(as noted inreferences/trust-boundaries.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions in
references/trust-boundaries.mdexplicitly tell the agent to treat browser-derived text as data and ignore any embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bashto drive theagent-browserCLI, which can perform network requests and manipulate page state. - Sanitization: Instructions specify that the agent should verify outcomes independently and avoid reproducing secrets from the browser environment.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local sensitive configuration files in
~/.config/and transmits authentication tokens to external services, including provider APIs and the Coolify management console atapp.coolify.iofor managing the vendor's browser pool. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Provides functionality to execute JavaScript within the browser context using
agent-browser eval, facilitating complex interactions with web applications through runtime code execution.
Audit Metadata