run-agent-device
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the application under test (such as UI text, network logs, and system alerts) which serves as an ingestion surface for potential indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdandreferences/bug-triage.md(viasnapshot -i,network dump, andlogs pathcommands). - Boundary markers: The skill does not specify explicit delimiters for data retrieved from the testing environment.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
agent-deviceCLI via shell execution (Bash). - Sanitization: The instructions proactively mitigate risks by directing the agent to use tool-generated reference identifiers (e.g.,
@e12) instead of raw text labels, explicitly noting this avoids shell-quoting hazards. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references installation commands for the CLI and associated plugins from the author's official GitHub repository.
- Evidence:
README.mdmentionsnpx -y skills add -y -g yigitkonur/skills-by-yigitkonur/skills/run-agent-device. - Context: These are vendor-owned resources used for skill deployment and do not involve unauthorized or suspicious third-party downloads.
- [SAFE]: No evidence of credential theft, data exfiltration, obfuscation, or persistence mechanisms was found. The skill's behavior is consistent with its stated purpose of providing an iOS testing workflow.
Audit Metadata