run-agentic-tests
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of user-defined commands to start development runtimes and perform implementation tasks. This is implemented using
child_process.spawnwithshell: falseto prevent shell injection. Furthermore, the system includes a process-host helper that verifies ownership of processes using unique start tokens and OS-level metadata checks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an inherent vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from application logs, source code, and web content during testing.
- Ingestion points: The framework reads application stdout/stderr logs (
scripts/lib/runtime.mjs), project source files during attestation (scripts/lib/source.mjs), and captures application evidence (references/scenarios-and-evidence.md). - Boundary markers: The protocol utilizes structured YAML records and role-specific markdown handoffs to isolate contexts, though it relies on the AI agent to respect these boundaries.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary subprocesses (
scripts/lib/process-host.mjs), perform Git operations, and interact with the GitHub API via theghCLI (scripts/lib/delivery.mjs). - Sanitization: It employs a
shellQuoteutility for instruction rendering and avoids shell interpolation for its internal process management logic.
Audit Metadata