run-codex-2
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to run the
codexCLI tool with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag enabled. This provides the model with full filesystem write access and unrestricted network egress, allowing it to perform tasks like dependency management and web research without user intervention. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
run-fleet.shscript usesevalto executepost_verify_cmdstrings. These commands are either auto-detected from the repository (e.g.,pnpm test,cargo check) or supplied via an externaltasks.jsonconfiguration file, creating a vector for arbitrary command execution if the task definition is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
setup-worktree.sh,run-fleet.sh,run-batch.sh) execute system-level commands and development binaries includinggit,npx,pnpm,npm,cargo, andgobased on the content of the target repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Prompt templates provided in the
references/templates/directory contain instructions such as "SKIP ALL META-SKILLS", "DO NOT READ SKILL FILES", and "DO NOT ASK QUESTIONS". These are designed to override default AI agent behaviors to optimize for sub-agent performance and token usage. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While no explicit exfiltration commands were detected, the inherent bypass of sandbox approvals combined with the model's ability to execute network tools creates a significant surface for data exfiltration from the local environment.
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