run-tailscale-funnel

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation and instructions (e.g., in references/macos-dns-fixup.md) direct the agent to execute system-level commands with elevated privileges using sudo. These commands involve creating system directories in /etc/resolver/, writing configuration files, and flushing system-level services like mDNSResponder. Modifying system-wide DNS resolution paths is a high-impact operation.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/funnel-down.sh uses the source command to execute a state file located in the temporary directory (/tmp/tailscale-funnel-state-...). The contents of this file (specifically PREVIOUS_TARGET) are derived from the output of the tailscale funnel status command in scripts/funnel-up.sh. If an attacker can influence the output of the Tailscale CLI (for example, by controlling the name of a node or a proxy target in the tailnet), they could inject malicious shell code that would be executed when the state file is sourced.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 27, 2026, 12:27 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — run-tailscale-funnel