use-codex

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: In batch mode, scripts/render-prompts.sh ingests data from an external inputs file. In exec and single modes, scripts/render-task-prompts.sh wraps raw description files (e.g., tickets, issues) into prompt files.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers like # Intent and # Input as delimiters, but lacks explicit instructions for the model to ignore embedded instructions within the substituted content.
  • Capability inventory: AI agents are executed using the codex CLI with the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag, which allows full filesystem write access and network egress across all scripts.
  • Sanitization: No escaping or filtering is performed on external content before it is interpolated into the prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs various system and build-related commands as part of its normal operation.
  • Evidence: Scripts such as scripts/run-fleet.sh and scripts/setup-worktree.sh execute commands like git, npx prisma generate, and various test runners (pnpm test, npm test, cargo check).
  • Context: These executions are necessary for managing git worktrees and validating code changes produced by the agents.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill enables outbound network access during agent execution.
  • Evidence: The configuration in scripts/codex-flags.sh explicitly uses the sandbox bypass flag for the codex CLI.
  • Context: This capability is documented as intended to support use cases such as web searches, vulnerability scanning, and fetching dependency information.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 15, 2026, 03:52 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — use-codex