yixiaoer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
uploadaction withinscripts/api.tsallows the agent to read local files usingfs.readFileSyncand upload the content to a remote server via aPUTrequest to a service URL. While designed for media publishing, this mechanism can be exploited to exfiltrate sensitive local files such as environment variables, SSH keys, or system configurations if a malicious path is provided to the tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is driven by a local TypeScript script (
scripts/api.ts) that executes complex operations involving direct filesystem access and unverified network communications. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Documentation across the skill (e.g.,
SKILL.mdanddocs/publish/index.md) contains structured meta-instructions under 'Logic Flow' and 'Trigger' headers. These instructions are designed to override the agent's default reasoning and enforce a specific execution protocol, which could be used to steer the agent towards unsafe actions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of external data. 1. Ingestion points:
scripts/api.tsretrieves data from remote API endpoints viacallApi(e.g., account lists, categories, records). 2. Boundary markers: Absent in the provided documentation and logic flows. 3. Capability inventory:scripts/api.tsprovides tools for disk read and network upload. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the tool parses remote JSON responses and incorporates them directly into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata