remo-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute an installation script from the author's GitHub repository using
bash -c "$(curl -fsSL ...)". This method executes remote code directly in the user's shell environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
cargo install --gitto pull and build remote code from the author's repository. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads various components from external GitHub repositories under the author's namespace (
yjmeqt), including the Remo SDK via Swift Package Manager and CocoaPods, and the CLI via a Homebrew tap. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands to verify the environment and orchestrate the
remoCLI tool for device discovery and application inspection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface is present because the skill processes untrusted output from external applications via the Remo CLI.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
remo devices,remo tree,remo info, andremo call(inreferences/cli.md) ingest data from running simulators or devices into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat application data as untrusted or separate from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, interact with the local file system (saving screenshots and videos), and perform CLI-based orchestration.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps for sanitizing, validating, or filtering the data received from the Remo-enabled applications before processing.
Audit Metadata