requirements-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external, untrusted content.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests user input for raw intent in Stage 1B and supports the processing of structured documents (PRDs, RFCs, specs) in Stage 2.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or escape sequences to separate user-provided data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to invoke downstream tools and skills such as 'spec-writing', 'task-breakdown', 'sprint-planning', and 'system-design' using the processed data.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, validation, or sanitization protocols for external content before it is incorporated into the synthesis or handoff phases.
Audit Metadata