docx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes content from untrusted .docx and .doc files which could contain hidden instructions for the agent.\n
- Ingestion points: Content is extracted from documents via pandoc and XML unpacking in SKILL.md.\n
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands when the agent reads the extracted text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute system commands (soffice, pandoc, pdftoppm), run local scripts, and install NPM packages.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted document text is performed before it reaches the agent context.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on various system binaries and local scripts to perform its functions.\n
- Executes system utilities including pandoc, LibreOffice (soffice), and Poppler (pdftoppm) for document analysis and conversion.\n
- Invokes several local Python scripts (unpack.py, pack.py, validate.py, comment.py) to manage Word XML structures.\n
- Uses npm to install the docx library globally as part of the setup process.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading external software and libraries to operate.\n
- Instructions command the global installation of the docx package from the NPM registry.\n
- References external system dependencies like LibreOffice and Poppler for specific workflow stages.
Audit Metadata