create-model-selection-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to discover the environment and verify model availability, including
gh auth status,bun --version,orca orchestration run-create, and various agent-specific CLI tools likeclaude,grok, andcodex. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files including agent configuration files (
~/.claude/settings.json,~/.codex/config.toml,~/.grok/config.toml) and detailed session history logs (.jsonlfiles in Codex and Grok session directories). While the data is used to generate a local skill, reading these private paths constitutes significant data exposure. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The core functionality is the automated generation of a new skill (
select-model) based on environment discovery. This involves creating new markdown instructions that are interpreted as logic by the agent in future tasks, effectively performing dynamic instruction generation. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill establishes persistence by installing the generated
select-modelskill into~/.agents/skills/and creating relative symlinks in product-specific directories like~/.claude/skills/and~/.grok/skills/, ensuring the generated logic is active across future agent sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect injection by ingesting data from external model catalogs and local session logs (e.g., in
SKILL.mdStep 2 andreferences/grok.md). This untrusted content is interpolated into the generatedselect-modelskill without explicit sanitization or safety boundary markers, which could allow malicious data in a log or catalog to influence future agent decisions.
Audit Metadata