Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents and derived images to extract text, tables, and form field information. This creates a surface where malicious content within a document could attempt to influence the agent's interpretation of data or its subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points: Text and table extraction methods described in
SKILL.mdand visual analysis of PNG images described informs.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate user-provided PDF content from the agent's instruction context.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables writing to the local file system (PDFs, Excel, images) and executing PDF utility commands (e.g.,
qpdf,pdftoppm). - Sanitization: Extracted content is processed as raw data without specific filtering for malicious instructions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkeypatch for thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod. This is used to resolve a known incompatibility in the library when processing selection lists. The implementation is static and scoped to improving the reliability of form-filling operations.
Audit Metadata