spoken-response

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include shell blocks that execute agent-voice by interpolating variables like $RESPONSE_AS_TEXT directly into command strings. This pattern can be vulnerable to command injection if the response content contains shell-active characters and the executing shell does not perform proper escaping.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the agent-voice package from the author's public resources using the uv tool manager as part of the setup process.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes text generated by the assistant, which could be influenced by untrusted conversation history, and uses that text as input for system-level commands.
  • Ingestion points: Assistant response text (current or previous) is captured and assigned to variables in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None are defined to separate the assistant's text from the surrounding command context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs shell execution (agent-voice speak) and local tool configuration (agent-voice setup) within SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: The instructions provide rules for formatting (e.g., converting HTML entities like   to normal spacing) but do not mandate specific shell-safe escaping for the interpolated content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 11:04 AM