spoken-response
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates variables directly into shell commands within SKILL.md and its references. Specifically, the command
agent-voice speak "$RESPONSE_AS_TEXT" --label "$LABEL"and the delivery templateagent-voice play "$path"use double-quoted variable interpolation. If these variables contain shell-active characters like backticks or semicolons, it could lead to unintended command execution in the user's terminal.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes assistant responses which may be influenced by external data or user prompts, creating an injection surface. - Ingestion points: The
RESPONSE_AS_TEXTvariable is populated from current, previous, or thread-based assistant responses. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or specific delimiters are used to wrap the interpolated text or warn the shell environment to ignore embedded control characters.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
agent-voice speak,uv tool install), perform setup operations, and create/remove temporary files outside the workspace. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the text content before it is passed to the shell.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include commands to install a third-party tool using
uv tool install agent-voiceand references the source code hosted athttps://github.com/yoav0gal/agent-voice. This introduces an external dependency that is downloaded and executed on the host system.
Audit Metadata