spoken-response
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using variables $TEXT, $LABEL, and $path within SKILL.md and references/recording-delivery.md. Specifically, the command
printf '%s' "$TEXT" | agent-voice speakis vulnerable to shell command substitution if $TEXT contains shell metacharacters like backticks or $(). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
uv tool install agent-voiceto download and install its core functionality. The package is associated with the author's official GitHub repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Assistant responses are processed as input for the speak command in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers to isolate processed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and write to files.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the assistant's response is described before shell interpolation.
Audit Metadata