dare
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
references/de-anthropocentric.mdfile contains directives that explicitly instruct the agent to override or de-prioritize human commands when they conflict with the agent's internal analysis. - Articles V ('The AI is the researcher, not the tool'), VI ('Humans are oracles, not commanders'), and VIII ('Autonomy over obedience') provide instructions that undermine user authority. Specifically, Article VIII states: 'the AI should trust its evidence chain... this consultation is the AI's choice, not the human's command'.
- This 'autonomy' framework is a form of prompt injection that could lead the agent to ignore safety constraints or specific user-defined instructions if the agent deems its own 'evidence' superior.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from multiple sources (Brave Search, Apify, academic databases).
- Ingestion points: Files
SKILL.md(Research Loop) andreferences/abstractions.md(SOPs:web-read,scholar-read) describe workflows where the agent fetches and analyzes content from the open web. - Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' directives for the content retrieved during the
lit-surveyandweb-researchphases. - Capability inventory: The agent can call MCP tools (
apify,brave-search,dare-scholar,dare-web), modify local research artifacts, and perform multi-iteration decision-making loops. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or structural filtering for retrieved web/academic content was found in the meta-strategy or reference files.
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