ultimate-scraper

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run in scripts/tiers/tier2_5_agentbrowser.py and scripts/session/manager.py to execute the agent-browser CLI. This involves passing arguments derived from input URLs and session states to the system shell.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The implementation of Tier 2 (cloakbrowser) and Tier 3 (camoufox) triggers the download of large, unverified browser binary packages (~200MB and ~780MB respectively) from external registries during execution.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: All browser-based tiers (scripts/tiers/tier2_scrapling.py, scripts/tiers/tier2_5_agentbrowser.py, and scripts/tiers/tier3_camoufox.py) use dynamic code execution via page.evaluate() or eval() to inject the skill's own logic (e.g., Shadow DOM piercing, WebMCP interception) into the browser context of the target website.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests arbitrary content from untrusted websites and interpolates it into prompts for the AI extraction router (scripts/extraction/ai_router.py) and vision router (scripts/extraction/vision_router.py) without sufficient boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions. This ingested data is processed by the agent which has capabilities including network access and file writes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 1, 2026, 06:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ultimate-scraper