ultimate-scraper
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/tiers/tier2_5_agentbrowser.pyandscripts/session/manager.pyto execute theagent-browserCLI. This involves passing arguments derived from input URLs and session states to the system shell. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The implementation of Tier 2 (
cloakbrowser) and Tier 3 (camoufox) triggers the download of large, unverified browser binary packages (~200MB and ~780MB respectively) from external registries during execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: All browser-based tiers (
scripts/tiers/tier2_scrapling.py,scripts/tiers/tier2_5_agentbrowser.py, andscripts/tiers/tier3_camoufox.py) use dynamic code execution viapage.evaluate()oreval()to inject the skill's own logic (e.g., Shadow DOM piercing, WebMCP interception) into the browser context of the target website. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It ingests arbitrary content from untrusted websites and interpolates it into prompts for the AI extraction router (
scripts/extraction/ai_router.py) and vision router (scripts/extraction/vision_router.py) without sufficient boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions. This ingested data is processed by the agent which has capabilities including network access and file writes.
Audit Metadata