edge-computing-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides templates that ingest untrusted data from network request components (URL parameters, headers, and cookies) and uses them to perform sensitive actions like network requests.
- Ingestion points: The
handleProxyfunction intemplates/edge-function.tsextracts atargetUrlfrom query parameters, andtemplates/edge-middleware.tsparses cookies and headers from incoming requests to make routing decisions. - Boundary markers: The templates do not use delimiters or include instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded directives in the processed request data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
fetchAPI for outbound network communication and interacts withKVNamespacefor reading and writing persistent storage data. - Sanitization: The
handleProxyimplementation intemplates/edge-function.tsperforms minimal validation, checking only the URL protocol (http:orhttps:) but failing to implement a whitelist or block internal network addresses (e.g., local loopback or cloud metadata services), facilitating SSRF attacks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
handleProxyimplementation intemplates/edge-function.tscontains a pattern that forwards sensitive credentials to an arbitrary, user-controlled destination. - Evidence: The template explicitly forwards the
Authorizationheader from the incoming request directly to the externaltargetUrlvia thefetchcall, which can lead to the exfiltration of authentication tokens to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Audit Metadata