demo-producer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate.shgenerates shell scripts by interpolating metadata extracted from external files (such asSKILL.mdand agent definitions) using unquoted heredocs. Variables like${DEMO_NAME},${DEMO_DESCRIPTION}, and${PHASES}are written directly into generated bash scripts. A malicious source file containing command substitution payloads (e.g.,$(touch /tmp/pwned)) in these fields would cause the commands to be executed when the generated script is run by thevhstool. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill involves dynamically generating executable bash scripts and VHS configuration files (
.tape) at runtime based on parsed inputs from other files in the project. These generated assets are subsequently executed to facilitate the video production pipeline. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from skill and agent markdown files to drive its script generation process. It lacks robust sanitization and boundary markers in
scripts/generate.sh, allowing malicious content in those source files to escape the intended string context and execute in the shell. Ingestion points include the metadata extraction functions inscripts/generate.sh, while capabilities include fullBashexecution, file writing, and tool invocation. Sanitization is only partially implemented for theclicontent type viaprintf %q, leaving other types vulnerable. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a
--livemode that utilizes Tailscale Funnel (portless --funnel) to expose the development stack via a public URL. While this is an intended feature for sharing demos, it creates a significant security surface for the accidental exposure of private code, credentials, or environment details to the public internet.
Audit Metadata