explore
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The utility script
scripts/post_explore_summary.pyreferences a non-standard PyPI registry (pypi.yonyon.ai) to obtain theyg-mcp-corepackage. This introduces potential supply chain risk through the use of an unverified third-party repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests codebase files and search results using
Read,Grep, andGlob, passing this data to several sub-agents for analysis. The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide sanitization, creating a surface where malicious instructions in the code being analyzed could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
src/**,package.json, and search outputs defined inSKILL.md. - Capability inventory:
Bash,Write, andAgenttool execution for sub-agent creation. - Boundary markers: None present in the prompts for exploration sub-agents.
- Sanitization: No evidence of filtering or escaping external content before interpolation into prompts.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill contains deceptive metadata and prose, claiming compatibility with non-existent future model versions (e.g., "Opus 5.5") and specifying a future release date of "April 2026". Such claims can mislead users about the skill's tested environment and current capabilities.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Bashtool is used to execute several local components, including a repository structure indexer hook and Python/Node.js utility scripts within the skill directory. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Agenttool to concurrently spawn multiple specialized sub-agents with prompts that are dynamically constructed based on user input and file system content.
Audit Metadata