llm-integration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The script file
scripts/create-lora-config.mdutilizes dynamic context injection syntax (!command) to execute shell commands when the file is loaded by the agent. Specifically, it performs a recursivegrepacross.envfiles to discover model configurations. Since.envfiles are standard locations for sensitive credentials, API keys, and environment secrets, automated reading of these files poses a significant risk of data exposure. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The training script
scripts/dpo-training.pyexplicitly enablestrust_remote_code=Truewhen loading models and tokenizers via the Hugging Face Transformers library. This configuration permits the execution of arbitrary Python code defined within the model repository being accessed, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution if an untrusted or compromised model is loaded. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a template system in
scripts/create-lora-config.mdthat interpolates user-provided input ($ARGUMENTS) directly into markdown and YAML structures. The lack of explicit boundary markers or sanitization for this external data creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the resulting content is subsequently processed by an LLM. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
rules/local-ollama-setup.mdprovides instructions to download and execute an installation script fromollama.com. This represents a remote code execution pattern, although it targets a well-known service and includes a recommendation for the user to inspect the script before execution.
Audit Metadata