prd-to-goal

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily designed to generate complex shell command strings (assertions) that are executed as part of an autonomous /goal loop. These assertions include file system checks, test suite executions, and CLI tool interactions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from PRDs, GitHub issues, and local specification files to generate its output. A malicious document could attempt to inject shell commands into the acceptance criteria that the agent might then include in the generated /goal line.
  • Ingestion points: Arguments passed to the skill in SKILL.md, output from the gh issue view command, and contents of local files read via the Read tool.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack guidance on using delimiters or strict 'ignore' markers when processing the untrusted input content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment permits Bash, Write, Read, Grep, and Agent tools, enabling the execution of any generated shell strings.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the strings extracted from the input before they are formatted into the shell assertions.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Section 8 of the documentation describes a pattern for the agent to spawn independent sub-agents using a shell command (claude -p --bare) that reads prompt content dynamically from a temporary file in /tmp.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 10:57 AM