prd-to-goal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily designed to generate complex shell command strings (assertions) that are executed as part of an autonomous
/goalloop. These assertions include file system checks, test suite executions, and CLI tool interactions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from PRDs, GitHub issues, and local specification files to generate its output. A malicious document could attempt to inject shell commands into the acceptance criteria that the agent might then include in the generated
/goalline. - Ingestion points: Arguments passed to the skill in
SKILL.md, output from thegh issue viewcommand, and contents of local files read via theReadtool. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack guidance on using delimiters or strict 'ignore' markers when processing the untrusted input content.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment permits
Bash,Write,Read,Grep, andAgenttools, enabling the execution of any generated shell strings. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the strings extracted from the input before they are formatted into the shell assertions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Section 8 of the documentation describes a pattern for the agent to spawn independent sub-agents using a shell command (
claude -p --bare) that reads prompt content dynamically from a temporary file in/tmp.
Audit Metadata