review-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted input from GitHub pull requests, including titles, bodies, and code diffs.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches external data using gh pr view and gh pr diff commands as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or specific negative constraints to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed PR content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Read, Write, Edit, and the ability to spawn multiple specialized sub-agents, creating a significant attack surface if the agent is successfully manipulated.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested PR content before it is passed to the analysis agents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the Bash tool to perform its primary functions.
  • It executes gh CLI commands to interact with GitHub and runs local build, lint, and test commands defined in references/validation-commands.md.
  • PR identifiers and other metadata are interpolated into shell command strings, which is a necessary part of the workflow but reinforces the need for caution if the agent's context is compromised.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 30, 2026, 03:05 AM