review-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted input from GitHub pull requests, including titles, bodies, and code diffs.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches external data using
gh pr viewandgh pr diffcommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or specific negative constraints to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed PR content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Read,Write,Edit, and the ability to spawn multiple specialized sub-agents, creating a significant attack surface if the agent is successfully manipulated. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested PR content before it is passed to the analysis agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the
Bashtool to perform its primary functions. - It executes
ghCLI commands to interact with GitHub and runs local build, lint, and test commands defined inreferences/validation-commands.md. - PR identifiers and other metadata are interpolated into shell command strings, which is a necessary part of the workflow but reinforces the need for caution if the agent's context is compromised.
Audit Metadata