swarm-migrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from local YAML specification files (
swarm-specs/*.yaml) and repository contents (e.g., workflow files) to drive its logic. - Ingestion Points: Configuration is loaded from
swarm-specs/*.yaml(Phase 1). Transformation and verification steps read from the target repository's files (Phase 3). - Boundary Markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or markers to distinguish between trusted control logic and untrusted data contents within the processed repositories.
- Capability Inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash(shell execution),Agent(spawning subagents), andWrite(file system and PR creation). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the commands or data interpolated from external sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill involves executing arbitrary shell commands provided in the YAML specification.
- Evidence: The
transform.commandandverify.commandfields in the spec are directly executed using theBashtool during the migration process (Phase 3). - Context: While this is the intended purpose of the tool, it allows for arbitrary code execution if a malicious or compromised specification file is provided to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically executes logic based on run-time configurations and subagent feedback.
- Evidence: The skill uses the
Agenttool to spawngit-operations-engineerorbackend-system-architectsubagents to perform repository transformations. - Logic: The coordinator-subagent DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) is built dynamically from the
upstreamdependencies defined in the YAML file, which dictates the flow of execution and command dispatch.
Audit Metadata