auto
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user-supplied descriptions to determine execution paths.
- Ingestion points: The primary ingestion point is the user-provided
[plain-english goal]argument defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill incorporates several procedural boundaries, including a requirement for the agent to 'reason out loud' during classification and a 'Confirm' phase that mandates user approval before the selected route is executed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for tool invocation (
Skill,Task), file reading (Read,Grep,Glob), and user interaction (AskUserQuestion), but does not have access to network or direct system-level execution tools. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the goal string is performed; instead, the skill relies on the agent's internal classification logic and the provided
routing-rules.mdto map input to safe internal routes.
Audit Metadata