prd-to-goal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content such as PRD text, GitHub issue bodies, and local specification files to generate executable shell commands for goal verification. This design creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in the source documentation could attempt to influence the agent's behavior or manipulate the generated goal assertions.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts raw text inputs via the
prd-textargument, fetches issue data usinggh issue view, and reads local files. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions within the skill's logic to isolate or ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the processed requirements.
- Capability inventory: The skill operates within an environment where
Bash,Agent, andWritetools are available, providing a functional surface for an injection to target. - Sanitization: The instructions focus on decomposing text into assertions but do not define specific sanitization or filtering steps for the untrusted input content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is centered around generating and executing shell commands (e.g.,
test,pnpm,gh,jq) to monitor task completion. It also describes a post-timeout grader pattern that involves spawning a subagent via a shell execution of theclaudeplatform itself (claude -p --bare). while these are legitimate uses of the platform's capabilities, they represent the execution of logic derived from external data.
Audit Metadata