frontend-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture relies on reading external configuration and existing project files, creating a vector where untrusted data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project-level config (
ai/style.config.md), user-level config (~/.claude/style.config.md), and existing project source files duringrevamporqaoperations. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific requirements for using unique delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when interpolating these configurations into the subagent tasks or analysis routines.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files (
./proposals/), launch subagents with complex prompts, execute shell-based audits viagrep, and render generated content using Puppeteer. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content extracted from the configuration files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
qamode instructions include the execution of shell commands (grep,wc) to perform static analysis on the project's source code. While these are used for linting and auditing purposes, they provide a mechanism for shell interaction based on skill-driven logic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates self-contained HTML files containing design elements and layout logic. These files are subsequently executed/rendered using
mcp__puppeteer__puppeteer_navigate, representing a workflow where the agent creates and then views dynamic web content.
Audit Metadata