solar-duotone-bold
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [OBFUSCATION]: The file
demo/index.htmlcontains a large Base64-encoded string within theencodedHtmlvariable. This string decodes to a complete HTML document including a Content Security Policy, asset management scripts, and a WebGL-based background implementation. While used for sandboxing the demo, the use of Base64 to hide executable content is a significant obfuscation pattern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and references assets from well-known technology providers and CDNs, including Google Fonts (
fonts.googleapis.com), Fontshare (api.fontshare.com), Iconify (code.iconify.design), and Tailwind CSS (cdn.tailwindcss.com). These sources are generally trusted but represent external dependencies for the skill's runtime environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: In
demo/PROMPT.md, the agent is instructed to use external design references fromneuform.aiand the provideddemo/index.htmlas high-fidelity targets for generating new UI. This ingestion of external/complex content as a behavioral reference creates a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks where instructions could be hidden in the reference materials. - Ingestion points:
demo/PROMPT.mdreferences external URLs and the provided demo HTML. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not caution the agent to disregard potential embedded commands in the reference content.
- Capability inventory: UI generation (HTML/CSS/JS); no dangerous system, shell, or file-write capabilities were identified in the associated scripts.
- Sanitization: None. The agent is directed to match the fidelity of the references directly, increasing the likelihood of processing malicious instructions if present.
Audit Metadata