design-distiller
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
prompts/scraper.mdfile provides aBashcommand template for executing headless Chrome that directly incorporates{url}and{slug}placeholders. This pattern is vulnerable to shell command injection if the agent executes the string without proper escaping or validation of user-provided arguments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scraping logic utilizes headless browsers (
Chrome,Playwright,BrowserUse) which, if not configured with strict protocol restrictions, may be manipulated into accessing sensitive local files viafile://or other internal network resources if provided with a malicious URL. This poses a data exposure risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves scraping external websites and passing the extracted data (Phase 2) to an 'Analyzer' prompt. This creates a substantial surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions hidden within a target website's DOM or text could attempt to override the agent's instructions during the analysis phase.
- Ingestion points: Scraped DOM, CSS variables, computed styles, and page metadata from target URLs (
prompts/scraper.md). - Boundary markers: The prompt files lack clear delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to treat scraped content strictly as data or to ignore any directive-like text found within the external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent environment is highly capable, possessing tools for filesystem modification (
Write,Edit), network access (WebFetch,WebSearch), and shell execution (Bash). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction-filtering before the scraped data is interpolated into the analysis prompts.
Audit Metadata