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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external sources that are not under the user's control, such as web searches and social media platforms, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
SKILL.mdfile specifies that the agent should use "universal search + platform channels (X/Reddit/Podcasts)" and read first-party sources including documentation and source code. - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend cross-referencing and treating social media as "clues," but there are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" markers when recording this external data in the research log.
- Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including modifying project code (via the
implementtool), writing and executing local scripts for experiments, and performing network operations. - Sanitization: There is no description of sanitization or escaping of external content before it is processed by the subagents or recorded in logs.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to "run experiments, write measurement scripts, and modify code to verify hypotheses" (
跑实验、写测量脚本、改代码验证假设). This involves the generation and execution of arbitrary code at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing shell commands and scripts to perform "取证执行" (evidence gathering) and experimental verification. While delegated to an implementation track, these actions result in local system modifications.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The agent is tasked with establishing context by reading internal project source code, existing research logs, and environment configurations (
docs/research/,.harness/), which exposes internal intellectual property to the research process.
Audit Metadata