brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external content from the repository and user communications, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious data could override agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions direct the agent to read
git status,AGENTS.md, codebase files, existing documentation, and user-provided materials as part of its 'Frontier Grill' process (detailed inSKILL.mdandreferences/clarification-loop.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use XML tags, delimiters, or other boundary markers to isolate untrusted data from the core system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write new specification files to the
docs/specs/directory, update the project'sCONTEXT.mdglossary, and modify thework_indexwithin the.harness/directory if it exists. - Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization, filtering, or validation logic for the content it reads from the repository or user before including it in the reasoning context.
Audit Metadata