image-first-ppt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external files (PDF, Office, and images) via the
mineru-open-mcp.parse_documentstool to extract content for slide generation. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in these documents could attempt to override agent instructions. - Ingestion points: External document parsing via
mineru-open-mcp.parse_documentsandreference_intake. - Boundary markers: The workflow enforces a mandatory
deck-protocol.jsonstructured file and adeck-protocol.review.mdartifact which requires explicit user confirmation before any image generation begins. - Capability inventory: File system access (reading references, writing protocol and images), subprocess execution (CLI tools via MCP), network operations (API-based document parsing), and subagent spawning.
- Sanitization: The skill explicitly forbids rendering internal metadata or source labels in slide text and enforces visual QA gates to check for alignment and defects.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on MCP tools that execute local CLI commands (e.g.,
uvx,node plugins/ppt-composer/src/cli.mjs) for environment auditing (doctor), document parsing, and final PPTX assembly (assemble-image-ppt). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: For decks exceeding 7 pages, the skill is instructed to use
spawn_agentto create parallel subagents for image generation tasks based on theimagegen-jobs.jsonplan. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Setup instructions and tool checks involve
uvxandnpmpackage prewarming, which download external dependencies to the local environment.
Audit Metadata