compose-design-catalog

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include a command to download and execute a shell script from the author's GitHub repository using curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yschimke/skills/main/scripts/install.sh | bash. This pattern is considered high-risk as it executes remote code without prior review.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses npx to fetch and execute tools and references scripts located in external repositories for validation and generation tasks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing various command-line tools including node, git, gradlew, and compose-preview to process code and generate artifacts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill runs local JavaScript files and utilizes npx for runtime tool execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted project data. 1. Ingestion points: Reads Kotlin source files (.kt) and a user-provided catalog.spec.json file. 2. Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or mechanisms are provided to isolate untrusted data. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and perform file operations. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the content of the source files being analyzed.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yschimke/skills/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 11:05 AM