use-claude-code-subagents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct shell commands using unquoted placeholders such as
<name>and<mapped>. Because these values can be derived from external files or user input (e.g., an agent named with a semicolon), they present a significant risk of command injection where arbitrary code could be executed in the host environment.- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires the Shell tool to be invoked withrequired_permissions: ["all"]to bypass standard sandbox restrictions for network access and file writes to the user's home directory (~/.claude). Furthermore, it intentionally bypasses platform-level safety features such as the workspace trust dialog and the built-in review and undo capabilities for file modifications.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: - Ingestion points: The skill reads agent instructions and metadata from multiple local project and home directory paths (
.cursor/agents/,.claude/agents/,.codex/agents/). - Boundary markers: It employs single-quoted heredocs (
cat <<'BRIEF') to encapsulate the task body, which effectively prevents variable expansion and command substitution within that specific block. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Shell tool with full permissions, enabling file system modification, network operations, and execution of the
claudeCLI. - Sanitization: While it provides instructions to escape quotes and newlines when generating JSON for Cursor-format agents, it lacks robust shell-level sanitization or quoting for CLI arguments like the agent name and model identifier.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata