autonomous-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes architectures where the agent reads external specification files (e.g.,
specs/component-spec.md,docs/auth-spec.md) and persistent task notes (SHARED_TASK_NOTES.md). These data sources can be influenced by third parties or malicious actors if the repository is not strictly controlled. - Ingestion points: The
spec_fileargument in the Infinite Agentic Loop,docs/auth-spec.mdin the Sequential Pipeline, andSHARED_TASK_NOTES.mdin the Continuous Claude Loop. - Boundary markers: The provided examples lack delimiters (like XML tags or triple-backticks) or explicit instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the data files.
- Capability inventory: The loops utilize the
claude -pinterface, which typically grants the agent access to powerful tools includingBash,Write,Edit,Read,Grep, andGlob. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, validation, or escaping of the input files before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides templates and shell script examples (such as
daily-dev.sh) that automate the execution of Claude Code via theclaude -pflag. While this is the intended functionality of the skill, the autonomous chaining of commands that can write to the filesystem and execute shell operations creates a risk if the agent's logic is subverted or if it misinterprets requirements. The skill also references a local scriptscripts/claw.jsfor persistent sessions.
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