config-gc
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to read and audit the agent's internal configuration files, specifically
~/.claude/settings.jsonand~/.claude/settings.local.json. These files typically contain sensitive environment information, tool configurations, and potentially authentication secrets or tokens for connected services. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions provide several shell commands for the agent to execute, including complex
find,du,grep, andjqpipelines. These commands are used to identify files for deletion and to programmatically modify the agent's JSON configuration files. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides instructions and specific
jqcommands to modify the agent's permission whitelist (permissions.allowinsettings.json). While the intended use is to remove redundant entries, this mechanism provides a direct interface for altering the agent's security policies and access controls. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection by scanning and reading the contents of potentially untrusted local files.
- Ingestion points: Files located in
~/.claude/skills/*/SKILL.md,~/.claude/**/memory/*.md, and~/.claude/hooks/are read and processed to determine redundancy or staleness. - Boundary markers: The workflow relies on user confirmation (
[y/n/skip]) for each item, which acts as a manual boundary, but no technical delimiters are specified for processing the file content. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
mvfor soft-deletion,jqfor configuration modification, and standard shell utilities likefindandgrep. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from the memory or skill files before it is processed or displayed to the user during the audit.
Audit Metadata