santa-method
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary architecture involves reviewing and fixing content that may originate from untrusted sources or contains instructions that could influence the reviewer agents.
- Ingestion points: The
REVIEWER_PROMPTinSKILL.mdinterpolates{task_spec}and{output}directly into the prompt for sub-agents. - Boundary markers: The framework uses Markdown headers to separate data fields, which is a weak boundary that can be bypassed by adversarial content within the
{output}variable. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Agenttool to spawn sub-processes and afix_agentloop, meaning a successful injection in the output could potentially manipulate the verification result or the subsequent fix cycle. - Sanitization: There is no implementation of escaping, validation, or explicit 'ignore instructions' guards for the content being processed by the reviewers.
Audit Metadata