skill-comply
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/runner.pyexecutes shell commands provided insetup_commands, which are dynamically generated by an LLM inscripts/scenario_generator.pybased on the target skill's content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided Markdown files by interpolating their raw content directly into LLM prompts in
scripts/spec_generator.pyandscripts/scenario_generator.py. A maliciously crafted skill file could inject instructions to manipulate the generated compliance specs or test scenarios. - Ingestion points: The
generate_specandgenerate_scenariosfunctions read the target skill file from a user-provided path. - Boundary markers: The prompts use simple triple-dash (
---) separators, which provide weak isolation against adversarial content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.run, including package managers and file system modifications. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is applied to the content read from the target skill files before prompt interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts, including
runner.py,classifier.py, andspec_generator.py, usesubprocess.runto execute theclaudeCLI and various system utilities. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
ALLOWED_SETUP_EXECUTABLESwhitelist inscripts/runner.pyexplicitly permitsnpm,pip, andpip3. If an attacker-controlled skill file successfully influences the scenario generation process, it could trigger the installation and execution of malicious code from remote package registries.
Audit Metadata