skill-comply

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/runner.py executes shell commands provided in setup_commands, which are dynamically generated by an LLM in scripts/scenario_generator.py based on the target skill's content.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided Markdown files by interpolating their raw content directly into LLM prompts in scripts/spec_generator.py and scripts/scenario_generator.py. A maliciously crafted skill file could inject instructions to manipulate the generated compliance specs or test scenarios.
  • Ingestion points: The generate_spec and generate_scenarios functions read the target skill file from a user-provided path.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts use simple triple-dash (---) separators, which provide weak isolation against adversarial content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via subprocess.run, including package managers and file system modifications.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is applied to the content read from the target skill files before prompt interpolation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts, including runner.py, classifier.py, and spec_generator.py, use subprocess.run to execute the claude CLI and various system utilities.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The ALLOWED_SETUP_EXECUTABLES whitelist in scripts/runner.py explicitly permits npm, pip, and pip3. If an attacker-controlled skill file successfully influences the scenario generation process, it could trigger the installation and execution of malicious code from remote package registries.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 01:17 AM