agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides instructions for exposing local content to the internet to facilitate processing by remote vision models.
- Evidence: The documentation suggests running a local Python HTTP server (
python3 -m http.server) and exposing it viacloudflared tunnelto a publictrycloudflareURL. - Risk: Creating a public tunnel to a local filesystem directory allows external actors to access those files if the URL is discovered or the server is misconfigured.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves scraping and interpreting content from external, untrusted websites.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
agent-browser read,snapshot, anda11yfetch data directly from user-provided or agent-discovered URLs. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use specific delimiters or to ignore potential instructions embedded in the fetched markdown or accessibility trees.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, manage files, and perform network requests, which could be abused if the agent follows malicious instructions from a scraped page.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not describe any sanitization or validation steps for the data retrieved from external URLs before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on complex shell command sequences for its core functionality.
- Evidence: The file includes command blocks for
brew,agent-browser,ffmpeg, andcloudflared. - Context: Automated execution of these tools on untrusted data fetched from the internet increases the overall risk profile of the skill.
Audit Metadata