to-spec

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the conversation history and the codebase to generate documentation, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to use "el contexto de la conversación actual" (current conversation context) and "conocimiento del codebase" (codebase knowledge) as primary inputs (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions provided to the agent to sanitize, escape, or use delimiters when incorporating external content into the final specification document.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the repository (docs/specs/ or .hermes/plans/) and publish content to GitHub as issues (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent. The process "sintetiza lo que ya sabes" (synthesize what you already know) does not include validation steps for the content being synthesized.
  • Downstream impact: The mention of a ready-for-agent label for GitHub issues suggests that the generated output is intended to be consumed by other automated agents, increasing the risk that a successfully injected instruction could be executed by a downstream system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 10:26 AM