docs-pro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates a dynamic lookup mechanism in
LOOKUP.mdto retrieve information from external libraries.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the
query-docstool, which fetches third-party documentation content based on user-provided library names and queries.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or system-level directives to prevent the agent from following instructions that might be embedded within retrieved documentation strings.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
WriteandBashtools (as defined inDOCS-WRITE.md), which could be misused if the agent is successfully manipulated by malicious content in the fetched documentation.\n - Sanitization: There is no explicit process described for sanitizing or filtering the content of external documentation before it is processed by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
DOCS-WRITE.mdfile instructs the agent to execute shell commands to perform maintenance tasks.\n - Evidence: The agent is specifically directed to run
yarn prettier --write <file-path>to format files after editing. This behavior relies on theBashtool and involves the execution of external binaries on the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata