docs-pro

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates a dynamic lookup mechanism in LOOKUP.md to retrieve information from external libraries.\n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the query-docs tool, which fetches third-party documentation content based on user-provided library names and queries.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or system-level directives to prevent the agent from following instructions that might be embedded within retrieved documentation strings.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Write and Bash tools (as defined in DOCS-WRITE.md), which could be misused if the agent is successfully manipulated by malicious content in the fetched documentation.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit process described for sanitizing or filtering the content of external documentation before it is processed by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The DOCS-WRITE.md file instructs the agent to execute shell commands to perform maintenance tasks.\n
  • Evidence: The agent is specifically directed to run yarn prettier --write <file-path> to format files after editing. This behavior relies on the Bash tool and involves the execution of external binaries on the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 08:22 AM